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Robert B. Shelton* and David P. Vogtt

The Incidence of Coal Severance
Taxes: Political Perceptions and
Economic Realities
Public finance literature in recent years has addressed at some length
the states' ability to "export" a portion of their tax bases.' The political
dimensions of the issue, however, have changed considerably. National
attention now focuses on energy prices, their changes relative to other
commodity prices, and relative price changes between particular energy
sources. 2 The coal severance tax policies of the western states have proved
to be of particular interest and concern in the discussion regarding tax
exportation and energy prices. Amendments to the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 have been introduced in both houses of
Congress to limit coal severance taxes imposed by the states to no more
than 121/2% of the value of the coal f.o.b. mine. 3
The political leaders from states that import coal differ significantly in
their perception of the incidence of the severance tax from economists
who have examined the issue. In the coal importing states, both the
political leaders and many of the utilities that purchase coal generally
perceive that coal imported from coal producing states with coal severance
taxes is costlier as a result of the taxes. They argue that ultimately coal
severance taxes lead to higher prices for electricity, because the major
consumers of steam coal, the utilities, simply pass the tax forward to
consumers of electricity. On the other hand, some economists have argued
*Head, Economic Analysis Section, Energy Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak
Ridge, Tennessee.
tResearch Staff Member, Economic Analysis Section, Energy Division, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The authors would like to thank Tom Abbott, Albert M. Church,
and Dennis Zimmerman for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The authors are also
grateful to Tom Abbott and Dana Stuckwish for their research assistance. The views expressed in
this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of those individuals who
read earlier drafts or of Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
1. See McLure, Commodity Tax Incidence, 17 NAT'L TAX J. 187 (1964); McLure, The Interregional Incidence of General Regional Taxes, 24 PUB. FIN. 457 (1969); McLure, Taxation,
Substitution and Industrial Location, 70 J. POL. ECON. (1970); Hogan and Shelton, Interstate Tax
Exportation and States' Fiscal Structures, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 553 (1973); D. PHARES, WHO PAYS
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES? (1980).
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NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

that in fact the tax is passed backward to landowners who own the coal,
to labor in the form of lower wages, and to the owners of capital.
This dichotomy of viewpoints has become increasingly important in
light of the general concern over energy prices and the specific debate
over the limitation of state severance taxes on coal. We will first present
the two positions in the debate with excerpts from the written records of
the two sides. We will then examine the economics of tax shifting and
tax exportation, briefly summarizing the major issues. We knowingly
present the extreme positions in the debate because these extremes will
help illustrate the issues at hand. Some empirically estimated price effects
of severance taxes follow. We will conclude the paper by examining the
implications of the empirical results with regard to the tax exportation
issue.
1. THE POLICY DEBATE
The PoliticalPerceptions
Proponents of limitations on the state severance tax rely primarily on
the argument that the western states have become engaged in a major
income redistribution effort and, at the same time, have hampered our
domestic efforts to achieve "energy independence." They point to Montana's adoption of a 30% rate as a prime example of such detrimental
taxation. Some argue that as a result of coal severance taxes, the price
faced by the consumer-and in the case of steam coal, the major consumer
is the electric utility industry-is higher than it would otherwise be and
that revenues are transferred to the coal producing state from the coal
importing states. Both the coal importing and exporting states agree that
the price of coal should include compensation for any "externalities"
created by the mining of the coal, such as problems caused by "boomtown" phenomena or environmental degradation. The current controversy,
however, results from taxation in excess of the level necessary to compensate for implicit costs. Senator Durenberger of Minnesota argues that
the revenues from the severance tax far exceed the social cost of mining
the coal. He states:
There are millions of Americans who now depend on this coal for
their electricity supply. They ought to pay the entire cost of producing
and transporting coal. But they ought not to be charged billions of
dollars over a period of years to support general governmental programs for citizens in other states. Their right to freedom from an
unconstitutional tax imposed by a State in which they have no vote
is every bit as important as the right of the producing States to be
compensated for the impacts of coal mining and energy production ....
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The States have the right to recover from the producers and consumers of coal, oil, gas, other energy resources, and other mined or
harvested commodities, the costs which the States and their local
governments experience as a result of production. One would expect
a close correlation between the tax and expenditures made to mitigate
impacts.
But how are the severance taxes used? Are they spent to mitigate
the impacts of mining and energy production? No, Mr. President,
they are not. . . . Only a small portion of the funds are used directly
to mitigate impacts.'
Two more short excerpts from speeches supporting the legislation to
limit severance taxes further illustrate the political perceptions of the
incidence issue. Senator Bensten of Texas argues:
These high rates of State taxation on a resource that is the property
of all Americans also drives up the cost of energy. Let me give you
an example from the State I represent, the State of Texas. It is
estimated that by 1985 Texas will burn almost 24 million tons of
low sulfur Wyoming and Montana coal. Enactment of this legislation
will save the consumers of my State tens of millions of dollars on
their utility bills. We are dealing with a basic inequity here, Mr.
President. Why should the people of San Antonio pay sky high
severance taxes to Montana and Wyoming for coal extracted from
Federal lands, coal that is simply not the property of Wyoming and
Montana?5
Senator Bumpers from the neighboring state of Arkansas makes a
similar argument. Bumpers stresses the inequity of imposing high severance taxes on the citizens of Arkansas, because they have such a relatively low per capita income. He states:
Let me give you a few statistics here which I think you will find
interesting. There are 20 states that are almost totally dependent on
coal from these Western states. Who are the customers? The utilities.
And what do the utilities do? Frankly, they would like to see this
bill passed. But, if it does not, they are just going to pass it on to
their consumers. The fine people in my State of Arkansas, who just
happen to rank 48th in per capita income, are going to have to pay
that $3. a6 ton in their electric bills and yours are, too, and do not
forget it.
These statements indicate that all or most of the coal severance taxes
are viewed as a burden passed forward to consumers of coal, who all too
often are consumers in states other than those levying the taxes. No
4. S. Rep. No. 127, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1981).
5. Id. at 370.
6. Id. at 371.
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empirical evidence supporting this perception accompanies such speeches,
however, and as we shall see, the arguments are based on implicit assumptions about the coal market that some economists have questioned.
The Economic Realities
Several economists who have been aalyzing coal severance taxes
issues over the past several years argue that little, if any, of the tax is
actually shifted forward. They contend that a state wishing to export all
or even part of a severance tax must control a significant share of the
market, which is to say they must have market dominance.
Malcolm Gillis makes the following arguments:
In the case of coal, no single taxing jurisdiction occupies anything
resembling a dominant position in the relevant market. Each jurisdiction by itself faces relatively elastic demand. Therefore, the possibilities of substantial exporting of severance taxes on coal exports
to nonresident consumers would be exceedingly slim. Rather, in the
short run, higher severance taxes would be borne by recipients of
rents, in this case any quasi-rents accruing to labor and capital in
the taxed industry, and resource rents received by owners of coalmining rights. In the long run, such taxes would be largely borne
by resource rents. Only to the extent that these quasi-rents and resource rents are received by out-of-state factor owners would any
tax exportation take place. In particular, to the degree that such taxes
reduced the profits of coal-mining firms with share ownership concentrated outside the taxing jurisdiction, a substantial share of severance taxes could of course be exported to nonresidents. But resident
labor in the taxed industry could bear some of the burden as well,
particularly if unionization in the industry has resulted in workers
receiving wages above the competitive wage rate, as is particularly
likely in such states as West Virginia, where 95 percent of the mines
are unionized.'
Charles McLure, in commenting on Gillis's paper, makes a similar
argument with regard to a coal producing state's ability to export a severance tax to consumers of other states. He states, perhaps even more
strongly than Gillis, that the tax will be shifted backward rather than
forward.
A crucial element in the theory of tax exporting is the degree of
dominance of the relevant market by the taxing jurisdiction or jurisdictions. If, for example, a state with only a tiny share of the
national market for coal were to impose a severance tax on coal, it
is highly unlikely that it would be able to export the tax to consumers
7. Gillis, Sevrance Taxes and Energy Resources in the United States: A Tale of Two Minerals,
10 GROWTH AND CHANGE 63 (1979).
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in other states through higher prices for coal. Competition from coal
mined in other states would prevent it. A far more likely result is
that the tax would be borne by the owners of the firms extracting
the coal (in the short run) or by owners of coal deposits (in the long
run in which contracts are renegotiable). In either event the tax may
be exported, but the mechanism of exporting is not what naive proponents of such severance taxes seem to have in mind . ..

McLure continues by making the following observations about the
Montana tax:
It would seem unlikely that Montana or any other state could export
a tax on coal to conumers, since, even within the narrow market
for coal, the requisite market dominance simply is not there. 9
As already mentioned, we have selected extreme analytical positions.
However, other economists have made similar arguments. ". One important characteristic of most of the arguments by the economists and the
politicians warrants special attention-they are largely based on a priori
assumptions about the operation of the coal markets in the United States,
with little or no empirical analysis of the actual incidence of coal severance
taxes.
The Simple Geometry of Tax Shifting and Tax Exportation
Alternative state tax policy objectives have been analyzed extensively
in the literature.' For example, a state might pursue such objectives as
maximizing aggregate economic activity within the state or maximizing
tax exportation. The discussion presented above concerns the adoption
of a severance tax for maximizing tax exportation. A model state is
depicted in Figure 1. 2 For expositional purposes, we will assume that
the state has both large intrastate and interstate markets for its coal, with
the interstate market being the dominant market. We also will assume
that its production represents a significant proportion of the national coal
8. McLure, Severance Taxes on Energy Resources in the United States: Comment, 10 GROWTH
AND CHANGE 72 (1979).
9. Id. at 73.
10. Usually these arguments include numerous caveats which relate to the short-run and allow
for some forward shifting in this period because of intitutional factors. For a good discussion of
these factors, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY TAXATION: AN ANALYSIS
OF SELECTED TAXES 47-48 (1980). For a comparison of how severance taxes relate to other
taxes an electric utility might pay, see D. ZIMMERMAN, MONTANA COAL AND THE ELECTRICITY GENERATED BY MONTANA COAL: INCIDENCE ANALYSES OF STATE TAXATION
AND ESTIMATES OF TAX PER KWH AND MILLION BTUS (1981).
1I. See Russell and Toenjes, Natural Gas Producer Regulation and Taxation (Michigan State
University Public Utility Paper 1971); A. CHURCH, TAXATION OF NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES (1981); and Shelton and Morgan, Resource Taxation, Tax Exportation, and Regional
Energy Policies, 17 NAT. RES. J. 261 (1977).
12. This analysis is based on Shelton and Morgan, supra note 11.
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FIGURE 1.

market. In many respects, these assumptions correspond to the view of
coal exporting states held by the politicians sponsoring legislation to limit
state severance taxes. In Figure 1, the interstate demand is shown as Dx;
the intrastate demand is depicted as DD; and the total demand, which is
simply the horizontal summation of the interstate and intrastate demand
curves, is depicted as DT. The state's supply curve is shown as S. The
initial equilibrium quantities in the respective markets are simply P, QD,
Qx, and QT. We will assume that the severance tax levied by the state is
a per unit tax and its effect is to shift the supply curve upward to the left,
which is shown as a shift from S to Si. The demand curve that is of
interest to the state is the export demand curve. The state will attempt to
shift the supply curve into the elastic portion of the interstate demand
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curve, with the new equilibrium price and quantities being P, and QDI
and Qx1 and QTI.
The relative elasticities of the demand and supply curves present the
central issue in examining whether tax exportation can be an effective
tax policy. In the case being examined, elasticity of the export demand
curve relative to the state's supply curve determines the effectiveness of
a tax export policy. In general, we can say that the more inelastic the
export demand curve relative to the supply curve, the greater the opportunities for effective tax exportation.
The adoption of a state property tax yields interesting results. The tax
has the effect of changing the profit stream over time of a given coal
deposit and makes current production relatively more attractive than future
production. Therefore, for any given price, a greater quantity will be
supplied by producers which, in turn, means that an increase in the
property tax has the opposite effect of a severance tax. This effect has
been described as 'mining-out from under the tax." 3 Figure 1 represents
the effect of a property tax as a shift in the supply curve from S, to S2.
II. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The Frameworkfor Estimating the Incidence of Coal Severance Taxes
The intricacies and interactions of the regional coal markets of the
United States are quite complex. Regional differences in coal quality,
mining techniques, and spatially differentiated demand centers, as well
as the mode choices in transportation, combine to make the market structure difficult to model. Superimposed on the traditional market interactions
are direct and indirect taxes levied by some of the coal producing states
which may affect the final market price of coal.
Empirical estimation of the severance tax incidence should be conducted within a formal supply and demand framework. Of course, market
adjustments due to the imposition of a severance tax occur through changes
in the (pre-taxed) minemouth price of coal. Furthermore, the difference
between the observed prices received by mine owners and the observed
price paid by consumers includes the transportation tariff, the full severance tax, and other excise-type taxes. We will focus only on the severance tax since this is the tax being addressed in this paper. Ideally, the
delivered price of coal with the tax should be compared with the price
that would have been charged without the tax. Such a comparison can
be accomplished indirectly by estimating the relevant supply and demand
curves. Accordingly, we formulate an implicit demand function for each
coal burning electric utility. This demand formula expresses the quantity
13. CHURCH, supra note II at 67-72.
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of coal (Qd) that the utility will purchase as a function of the delivered
price (Pd) and other determinants of demand (a vector X).
The implicit demand curve:
[Eq. 1(a)]
Qd = a + b Pd + Ec Xi + e,
with a, b, and c representing the estimated coefficients and e the error
term. Similarly, an implicit supply curve represents each mine's supply
function. The formula below relates each mine's desired quantity (Q,) to
a vector of determinants of supply (Zj). The relevant price to producers,
however, is the FOB minemouth price (Pro) of coal (excluding severance
tax).
The implicit supply curve:
[Eq. 1(b)]
Q, = O-+ IPm + YYj Zj + E,
with a, 3, and -yj representing the estimated coefficients and E the error
term. The difference between the selling price to consumers and the price
received by mineowners represents the transportation tariff plus the full
severance tax (and other excise-type taxes which we are ignoring for
expositive purposes).
[Eq. 1(c)]
Pd
PM + TARIFF + Severance Tax.
In this formulation, we assume that transportation tariffs are set independently of the contract price of coal. Importantly, the actual tariff
charged may not reflect the true cost of transportation, i.e., railroads may
be extracting (spatial) monopoly rents. We also assume that when utilities
bargain with coal producers, they know what the likely rail tariff will be
on typical shipments, and they can evaluate alternative sources of coal
accounting for transportation charges. This formulation does not address
the issue of whether the transportation tariffs are set to extract spatial
rent. When a transaction has occurred, desired supply quantity (Qs) equals
the desired demand

(Qd).

Then, from a set of observed transactions and

delivered prices, we can estimate the supply and demand system in the
reduced form model of the equation system in 1(a) through 1(c).
The reduced form estimation equation is as follows:
Eq. (2)

P, = A + EBj Zj + YCiXi + D {Tariff +

Severance Tax}
where:
A

=

(a - a)/(b -13)

Bj= yj/(b -

Ci
D

=
=

13)

ci(b- 3)
B/(B- b)

and
0<D< I
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The empirical hypothesis to be tested in this study is whether or not
coal severance taxes are passed on to consumers. The share of tax passed
forward is expressed as the estimated value of D. The model formulated
here, in which the coefficient D represents the joint cost of the rail tariff
and severance tax, has some intuitive appeal given our assumptions.
Econometric reasons also necessitate using this formulation, as explained
shortly.
The Empirical Data Base
The electric utilities report salient statistics on the cost and quality of
each fuel shipment received. This information, published by the Department of Energy on Form 423, provides a rich data source to examine
a substantial component of the United States coal markets. The following
analysis uses the Form 423 data base for shipments during the period
1976 through and including 1980. The timeliness of this data also provides
an opportunity to examine a key regional energy market after the energy
"crisis" became apparent. Such recent data is not generally available at
the regional level.
Among the coal characteristics reported on Form 423 are the sulfur
content (% by weight), ash content (% by weight), energy content (Btu's
per lb.) and the total quantity shipped (in tons) and sources (by state) of
each coal shipment. The form also reflects whether the coal originated
from deep or surface mining operations. These characteristics are included
in the statistical analysis to account for shipment-specific quality differences.
In the formulation presented above, the actual rail tariff charge, rather
than an estimate of transportation cost, is used as the operant variable.
Form 423 does not identify the mode of shipment. Therefore, we have
limited the empirical analysis to shipments of coal to distances greater
than 100 miles and to tonnage greater than 5,000 tons in order to eliminate
shorthauls delivered by truck. To estimate the rail tariff for each shipment,
we formulated an auxiliary set of regressions relating the rail charge per
ton as a function of distance and distance squared. Separate equations
were estimated for east to east and west to east shipments. These were
estimated using reported tariff charges of rail shipments compiled by
Mobil Oil Company. As we were able to obtain the rail tariffs for 1977,
we inflated the estimated rail charges for other years, using the producer
price index for bituminous coal shipments by rail.
We independently estimated the distance of each shipment from state
of origin to state of destination using the rail distances as defined in the
National Coal Model. 4 We then compared the estimated "average" rail
14. The National Coal Model Description and Documentation, U.S. Department of Commerce
[NTIS (PB-263 334)]. Prepared for Federal Energy Administration, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1976).
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tariff charge for each shipment using the distance of each shipment in
the estimated rail rate equations. As already mentioned, to the extent that
the average rail tariff structure does not reflect the underlying costs, our
estimates should be considered estimates of typical rail tariff charges
rather than rail transportation costs.
There are several types of transactions by which utilities buy coal from
suppliers. The Form 423 data distinguished between three major categories: 1) spot market purchase; 2) the initial shipment under a new
contract; and 3) repeat shipments under a long-term contract. Some long
term contracts permit price adjustments through escalator clauses and are
identified in the data base. Our empirical analysis examines marginal
changes in the average market price induced by state taxation behavior.
Hence, multiple shipments with the same contract price would represent
duplicate observations. Therefore, we have excluded repetitive shipments
under old contracts unless they include the escalator clause. We have
analyzed the new long term contracts separately from spot market operations because of the differences in market interaction. Spot market
transactions represent short-term non-repetitive purchases. The demand
and supply characteristics tend to be much more inelastic with prices
subject to much more volatility.
The general pattern of coal shipments discernible from Form 423 data
can be found in Table 1, which summarizes our analysis of shipments
made during the period 1976 through 1980. We have used the Mississippi
River to differentiate between eastern and western coal producers. Two
reasons make the midwestern market (Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin) of particular interest. First, much of the political discussion has centered on the impact of western coal severance
taxes on midwestern utilities. Second, the midwestern market is one of
the more interesting markets to examine because it is a market in which
eastern and western coals compete directly. Eastern suppliers still serve
a somewhat protected east coast market (including Florida and Georgia),
while western mines supply the Pacific coast and southwestern states
(including Texas) in the same protected manner.
An evaluation of the impact of state taxing policies necessitates calculating the effective state severance tax rates for the period in question.
Through examination of state documents and telephone interviews with
state officials, we compiled a set of effective severance tax rates for each
of the important mining states during the period 1976 through 1980.
Significant changes in the tax structures during the sample period were
incorporated in the tax rate series. For example, New Mexico imposed
an ad valorem tax in 1976, but changed to a unit tax in 1977. The rates
we compiled were cross checked with other sources where possible.
The vagaries of each state's tax structure can pose quite complex an-
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TABLE 1.
Regional patterns of coal shipments (excluding repeat shipments without
escalator clauses and spot contract shipments)
Number of Coal Shipments from 1976-1980
MARKETS
Source

Indiana, Illinois
Iowa

Michigan, Minnesota
Wisconsin

Total

Western States
Colorado

94

0

94

Missouri
Montana
North Dakota
Utah
Wyoming
Total

37
371
0
24
260
786

0
663
30
0
11
704

37
1,034
30
24
271
1,490

1,144
1,122

715
82

1,859
1,204

2
107
0
0
0
2

0
823
253
84
4
80

2
930
253
84
4
82

Total

2,377

2,041

4,418

TOTAL

3,163

2,745

5,908

Eastern States
Illinois
Indiana

Iowa
Kentucky
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Virginia
West Virginia

alytical problems and often require some simplifications. 5 We have attempted, however, to maintain important peculiarities of the key mining
states. For example, Montana has both a per unit tax structure and a
simpler ad valorem tax.16 The per unit tax has several rates depending
upon the size of the shipment. The ad valorem tax structure has two rates.
Shipments of coal with an energy content greater than ,000 Btu's per
pound are taxed at a 30% rate, while coal with a lesser energy content
is taxed at a 20% rate. The tax structure yielding the higher revenue is
the one imposed. For the period under examination this was the ad valorem
15. See Church, supra note I I and ZIMMERMAN, supra note 10.
16. The state also imposes a differential tax for deep mined coal. However, none of the reported
shipments from Montana during the period analyzed came from deep mines.
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tax. We assigned either the 20% or 30%
rate based on the reported Btu
7
content of coal on the Form 423 data.'
The taxing states use both ad valorem and unit tax schemes. To develop
a consistent severance tax series, the ad valorem taxes were recomputed
to an equivalent per unit rate. This adjustment was required for the ad
valorem taxes levied by Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico (in 1976),
West Virginia and Wyoming. Calculating the equivalent effective tax
requires establishing the selling price net of transportation. To approximate this price, we used the selling price net of the estimated rail tariff
rate.
Other state taxes also may affect the price of coal. Often, determining
the effective rates of sales and property taxes on the selling price of coal
is intrinsically more difficult than determining effective rates for severance
taxes. The differences in the nominal tax rate structures, tax bases and
exemptions greatly complicate determinations of the actual effective rate
of sales and property taxes. Consequently, we chose to use only indicator
variables which are set equal to one if a state imposed a sales or property
tax which would be applied to coal mining activity. Local taxes were
excluded from consideration in determining these dummy variables, since
the focus is on state taxation policy.
Table 2 summarizes the set of taxes imposed by key coal mining states
in 1976 and 1980. The table indicates those states which imposed an ad
valorem severance tax and presents the estimated unit tax equivalent (in
nominal $/tons) in parentheses. The table indicates a large range in the
level of the severance tax rates imposed by the states in 1980, with the
smallest level of 4 cents per ton levied by Ohio and the largest tax of
$2.95 per ton imposed by Montana on coal shipments with an average
Btu content greater than 7,000.
The data series spans a period when energy markets and the economy
experienced inflationary pressure. We therefore converted all price data
from nominal to constant 1980 dollars using the GNP deflator. In addition,
the major characteristic of coal from the point of view of the utilities is
the energy content. We therefore converted other coal quality data and
prices to a million Btu (MBtu) bases.
17. One interesting anomaly observed in the data is that during the period 1976-1980, shipments
of coal from Montana mines to Montana utilities, under new contract, were all reported as having
an energy content of less than 7,000 Btus per pound. Out of state shipments have averaged a higher
Btu content of around 8,600. The tax rate structure enhances the use of lower Btu coal within the
boundaries of Montana. Since the ash content and sulfur content of the coal is roughly similar, using
the lower energy coal will require a greater volume of coal to be burned to provide the same amount
of electricity than if the higher Btu coal were utilized. This could increase the total level of particulates
and sulfur residuals released unless abated. Therefore, an indirect cost to Montana residents is a
potentially greater rate of pollutants, even though the tax has been espoused as an environmental
tax.
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TABLE 2.
Property and sales taxes on coal for years 1976 and/or 1980, and severance
taxes on coal for years 1976 and 1980"
Unit Severance Tax
Nominal $/10
1976
1980

Property
Tax

Sales
Tax

Colorado

Yes

Yes

0.071

0.607

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Maryland
Missouri
Montanab

No
No
No
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No

(1.27,

(2.13,

State

North Dakota
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Utah
Virginia
West Virginiab
Wyomingb

No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

1.75)

2.95)

0.650
0.040

0.850
0.040

(0.80)
(0.23)

(1.06)
(0.78)

'Excludes all local severance tax levies.
bStates with ad valorem severance taxes.

The EmpiricalAnalysis of Severance Tax Incidence
As described earlier, the empirical test to be conducted requires us to
estimate a reduced form supply and demand system. In the reduced form
(Eq. 2), the severance tax incidence can be obtained from the coefficient
for the charges which intervene between the observed delivered price and
the unobserved minemouth price received by the mine operator. The data
described above provides several determinants which can be classified as
supply or demand oriented characteristics.
One of the major cost differentials in regional coal production is whether
coal is produced by surface mining or underground mining. In the analysis, we include a dummy variable which is set to one for deep mined
coal. The coefficient is expected to be positive, indicating the greater
average cost of deep mined coal. The quantity in a shipment may yield
economies of scale in production and shipment. To capture these, the
total quantity is included as a supply related variable. Its expected sign
is negative. Finally, contracts that include an escalator clause which allows
the original contract price to be renegotiated are indicated with a dummy
variable. The sign of the coefficient of the term poses an empirical question

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

and depends on the average bargaining ability of producers, which, in
turn, is reflected in the final terms of the contract. If these producers are
very successful and are able to maintain prices above the market average,
the sign will be positive. If producers with escalator clauses lag behind
general market trends, the sign will be negative.
Various coal quality characteristics can affect the demand price the
utilities are willing to pay for coal. In order to standardize for the energy
content of various coals, the dependent variable (selling price) has been
expressed as constant dollars (1980) per million Btu's. Even with this
standardization the Btu price of coal varies considerably. For example,
some coal in Montana sells for about 30 cents per million Btu while some
higher Btu coal sells for about 90 cents (per million Btus) in Wyoming.
The transformation to account for Btu variations appears to be nonlinear.
Low Btu coal may require considerably more handling cost (i.e., more
tons of coal processed) for a given energy content. Therefore, we have
included the energy content of coal for each shipment as an explanatory
variable. The sign is expected to be positive, indicating a premium will
be paid for high Btu coal. Similarly, the ash and sulfur content of coal will
affect the demand price. The greater the ash and sulfur, the lower the price.
The signs of the coefficients for ash and sulfur (measured as pounds per
million Btus) therefore should be negative. Several exploratory analyses,
not reported here, also indicated that the ash content tends to be nonlinearly
related to the price when measured on a Btu basis. Consequently, we have
included a term (ash content squared) to capture this nonlinearity.
The input price is also likely to be partially determined by alternative
prices of coal available to a utility. To capture the alternative market price,
we have used the average price of coal by intra-state shipments for Indiana, Illinois and Iowa. The expected sign of this local price variable
is positive: the greater the local price, the higher the imported price may
18
be.
Sales and property taxes may also affect the price to consumers, as
discussed earlier. To test for this possibility, we include in the analysis
the dummy variables for sales and property taxes described in the data
base section. The coefficient will measure only the average impact on the
market price of these taxes imposed by some states because we are using
dummy variables, rather than actual effective rates. The coefficients of
these variables cannot be interpreted as an incidence rate. However, the
18. In several exploratory analyses, time dummies were included in the analysis as well. These,
however, were highly correlated with the local price variables, and when entered caused the local
prices to become insignificant. We felt it preferable to keep the local price variables, as the time
dummies may not only pick up general rise in local prices, but other factors (such as increases in
severance taxes) as well.
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sign of the coefficients will indicate the directional impact on price of
imposing the tax.
As already mentioned, true property taxes are expected to have a
negative sign. High property taxes arguably encourage mine operators to
increase their mining activities in order to mine-out from under the property tax.' 9 Therefore, if producers are willing to sell their coal at a lower
price in order to sell coal more quickly, the coefficient of the property
tax variable will be negative.
The severance tax incidence can be estimated from the coefficient of
the joint cost of rail tariff and severance tax imposed on each shipment.
As was stated earlier, this joint estimate is necessary on econometric
grounds. It is known that high severance taxes are charged by western
states (Wyoming and Montana) which also happen to make long distance
shipments with high per unit rail tariffs. This spatial association can result
in spurious correlations and present difficulty in estimation. Indeed, this
was the case for several alternative models, in that we found that multicollinearity between the rail charge and severance tax precluded independent estimation.
The sign of the incidence coefficient is expected to be positive, with
a value between 0 and 1. With the current formulations, the value of the
coefficient can be interpreted as the share of severance tax and rail tariff
charges passed through to utilities purchasing coal.
Some coal producing regions of the country could conceivably export
more of their severance tax than other regions because of differences in
demand conditions confronting different regions. For example, if some
state faces a relatively more inelastic demand function, perhaps because
of some special characteristic of the coal or its favorable spatial location,
that state presumably could pass more of a severance tax forward. As
mentioned above, a strong positive correlation exists between per unit
severance taxes and per unit rail tariff. In order to test whether there is
interaction between these variables which we have not accounted for
under our joint estimation procedures, we have included an interactive
term. The severance tax rate is multiplied by the distance of the shipment
providing a measure of the interaction of distance and tax rate. The
coefficient of the term could be negative (positive), indicating that the
greater the distance the lower (greater) the occurrence of forward shifting.
The complete set of variables described above were included in a set of
regression equations using data for the years 1976 through 1980. We considered two regional definitions for the area of competition between eastern
and western coal suppliers. The first region included Indiana, Illinois, and
19. CHURCH, supra note I1 at 67-72.
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Iowa. A second area, comprised of the previously listed states and the states
of Minnesota, Michigan and Wisconsin, was also considered.
As stated earlier, we excluded all repeat shipments unless they included
an escalator clause. We also included only shipments over 5,000 tons to
better reflect the rail tariff charges reported by the Mobil Oil report. And,
finally, we analyzed the long term contracts separately from the spot
market shipments. Our primary focus is in the impact of the severance
tax on the long term market price. The spot market, of course, is affected
by many short term fluctuations. We felt including the spot market for
comparative purposes would prove useful nonetheless.
The price to the utility of each shipment is reported in terms of 1980
dollars per million Btus. This selling price is used as the dependent
variable in the regression. Observations in which any of the variables
were missing were excluded from the analysis, but a large sample still
remained.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the four regression analyses. The
explanatory variables are grouped by the classifications established in the
general discussion. All coefficients for the long term markets are statistically significant at the 1% level and the overall equation (R2) is acceptable. Our expectations concerning the signs of all variables for which
an a priori argument was advanced are met.
The regression equation results indicate that on average about 29% of
coal severance taxes are passed through to consumers in Indiana, Illinois,
and Iowa. For the broader market area which also includes Michigan,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin, approximately 40% of the severance tax is
passed forward. The analysis also indicates that sales taxes result in some
forward shifting. On average, producers in states which impose a sales
tax receive $0.37 per million Btus more in the three state market area.
The severance tax/distance interactive term has a positive sign that indicates that shipments from long distances, primarily Montana and Wyoming, may pass through somewhat more of the severance tax than
shipments from producing states closer to the midwestern market.
The property tax variables in the long term results have negative signs
indicating that producers may be attempting to mine-out from under the
tax in those states which impose a property tax on coal. Another empirical
finding in the long term results relates to the effectiveness of escalator
clauses to maintain market prices. Interestingly, the escalator clause appears to be an insufficient means for keeping up with market trends.
Several of the coal characteristic variables tend not to be important in
the spot market equations. 2 ° In addition, severance tax incidence tends
20. The coal characteristic variables that tend not to be important in the spot market equations
are primarily quantity and ash content.
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TABLE 3
Shipments of over 5,000 tons of coal to utilities in a three-state market area
(Indiana, Illinois, Iowa)
Dependent variable: selling price to utility in 1980 dollars per million Btu's
Spot Market Sales

Long Term Contracts
Standard
Error

Variables

Coefficient

Intercept
Supply Characteristics
Deep Minedp5.5a
Quantity (thousand tons)
Escalator Clausea
Demand Characteristics
Energy Content Btu/Ton
Sulfur Content lb/MBtu
Ash Content lb/MBtu 2
Ash X Ash (lb/MBtu)
Local Market Price $1980/MBtu
Supply State Taxes
Propertya
a
Sales
Severance Tax Variables
Rail Tariff + Severance Tax
($1980/MBtu)
Severance Tax X Distance
(1,000 miles)

-0.718

0.115

0.171
-0.591
-0.238
0.055
-0.044
-0.052
0.002
1.208

Standard
Error

Coefficient

1.128

0.116

0.011
0.067
0.032

0.123
0.069b
n.a.

0.013
0.231
n.a.

0.004
0.006
0.006
0.0002
0.034

0.057
-0.039
- 0.008'
0.0002b
1.042

0.004
0.005
0.004
0.0001
0.036

-0.004b
0.004b

0.026
0.026

0.289 0.050

0.656

0.071

0.897 0.113

0.336 b

0.254

-0.382 0.046
0.374 0.042

Mean Price = 1.092
R 2 = 63.8%
Number of shipments = 3,114

-

Mean Price = 1.05

R2

Number of shipments

=
=

51.0%
2,446

'Dummy variables.
bNot significant at 5% level.
'Significant at 5% level.
Coefficients not marked are significant at 1%level.

to be higher in the spot market than in the long term market. The difference
may reflect inelasticity in the short term demand by utilities which need
to enter the spot market for large shipments.
In summary, the empirical results indicate that generally about 29 to
40% of the coal severance taxes are passed through to consumers. Standard calculations, however, indicate a rather large margin of error; a
conservative estimate of two standard deviations yields a plus or minus
10% range. Furthermore, the results indicate that the higher western
severance taxes, on average, may be shifted forward to midwestern mar-
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TABLE 4.
Shipments of over 5,000 tons of coal to utilities in a six-state market area
(Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin)
Dependent variable: selling price to utility in 1980 dollars per million Btu's
Long Term Contracts
Variables

Coefficient

Intercept
Supply Characteristics
Deep Mineda
Quantity (thousand tons)
Escalator Clausea
Demand Characteristics
Energy Contenta (MBtu/tons)
Sulfur Content (lb/MBtu)
Ash Content (lb/MBtu)2
Ash X Ash (lb/MBtu)
Local Market Price ($1980/MBtu)
Supply State Taxes
Propertya
Salesa
Severance Tax Variables
Rail Tariff + Severance Tax
($1980/MBtu)
Severance Tax x Distance
(1,000 miles)
Mean Btu price = $1.13
Number of

R=
shipments =

Spot Market Sales

Standard
Error

Coefficient

Standard
Error

- 1.250 0.066

-

1.077

0.082

0.073 0.007
-0.664 0.049
-0.092 0.018

0.073 b
-0.130
n.a.

0.009
0.197
n.a.

0.062
-0.036
-0.028
0.001
1.268

0.002
0.004
0.004
0.0001
0.023

0.054
-0.043 b
-0.002
0.00004b
1.035

0.003
0.004
0.003
0.0001
0.029

-0.153
0.151

0.011
0.010

-0.090
0.083

0.015
0.013

0.410

0.028

0.548

0.037

0.373

0.050

0.690

0.163

65%

5,860

Mean Btu Price = $1.16
R= 62%
Number of shipments = 3,631

'Dummy variables.
bNot significant at5% level.
Coefficients not marked are significant at 1% level.

kets to a greater degree than those severance taxes imposed by nonwestern states. Given the indirect method used to estimate rail tariff
charges, the analysis cannot differentiate the potential split in spatial rents
among railroad, mineowners, and state taxing authorities. The results
nevertheless do indicate that states which apply severance taxes are not
necessarily recapturing spatial rents previously taken by the railroads.
II1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We began this paper by presenting a dichotomy of views regarding the
ability of states to export their coal severance taxes to consumers in other
states. The politicians in the coal importing states argue that most or all
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of the tax is passed forward in the form of higher prices. Some (and we
hasten to add not all) economists argue that little, if any, of the tax is passed
forward in the short-run or the long-run. Our empirical evidence suggests
that we might summarize the merits of these positions by analogy to the
proverbial dispute over a half empty, or half full, glass of water. The politicians and the economists are both half right or they are both half wrong.
In some sense our five year empirical test was neither of the traditional
short-run nor of the traditional long-run, but rather of the intermediate
run. The time period in question suffices in length to permit some marginal
adjustments in the capital stock of the transportation system and existing
mines. Considering the length of time required to open new mines or
construct new transportation links, however, the empirical results do not
capture the long-term incidence of coal severance taxes.
The extreme positions between the practical politician, who views the
"real world" and the economist arguing from the perspective of perfectly
competitive markets can perhaps best be illustrated with this accounting
identity: final selling price = transportation charges + severance tax +
minemouth price. In the very short-run, the politician is correct in some
circumstances. The final selling price can be approximated by adding the
taxes and transportation charges to the current minemouth price. The
economist recognizes that market forces will limit the forward shifting.
Indeed, in perfectly competitive markets, the individual producers in
taxing states will be forced to lower their minemouth charge to absorb
the tax. Nevertheless, as our analysis suggests, these market adjustments
require time. This is especially true in the case of coal in which large
capital investments in transportation facilities and coal mining equipment
might be required to bring about equilibrium in the regional systems of
markets. Indeed, our empirical analysis indicates that coal producers are
able to shift forward some of the severance tax. The evidence also demonstrates that there can be regional differences.
One final point warrants emphasis. This paper serves to underscore the
pitfalls of sweeping institutional adjustment factors aside. As others have
recognized, and this paper has verified empirically, there are spatial rents
to be captured in the short-run and these can accrue to states as well as
railroads."' While it is true that no state may have long-run dominance
in the production of coal, we have shown that in the short-run, both the
requisite adjustments in the mining industry and especially in the transportation system act as constraints to the competitive adjustment process
and allow for partial exporting of the severance tax base.

21. Zimmerman, Rent and Regulation in Unit-Train Rate Determination, 10THE BELLJ. ECON.
(1977).

